Take-away: At time of defendant’s sentencing in June 2018, the statutory safety-valve provision, which allowed relief from statutory mandatory minimum sentences, did not apply to offenses under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).
This case stems a December 11, 2017 interdiction by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The USCG intercepted a go-fast vessel in the high seas approximately 50 nautical miles north of Farjardo, Puerto Rico. USCG performed a lawful boarding and found three individuals, including De La Cruz, and 53 bales (~1,325 kilograms) of suspected cocaine on board the vessel. On December 20, 2017, De La Cruz was brought to Puerto Rico and charged with (1) conspiracy to possess a controlled substance on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503, 70506; (2) aiding and abetting possession of a controlled substance on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503, 70506, and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (3) conspiracy to import a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, 963.
De La Cruz thereafter entered a straight plea of guilty on all counts. At the sentencing hearing, he argued that he qualified for “safety valve” relief (i.e. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)), but the Government opposed arguing that the plain language of the safety valve statute did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA since it was not an enumerated offense under the statute. The District Court, Judge Francisco Besosa, agreed and declined to break the mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment for the MDLEA offenses. De La Cruz appealed his sentence to the First Circuit arguing that the district court erroneously determined that the safety valve provision did not apply to MDLEA offenses.
In ruling on whether safety valve applied to the MDLEA in June 2018, the First Circuit agreed with Fifth, Eleventh, and Ninth Circuits holding that “the applicable safety valve provision did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA based on the plain language of the statute as well as the history and structure of that statute and others.” More specifically, the First Circuit held that:
The language of the safety valve provision plainly and unambiguously did not apply to offenses under the MDLEA. Section 3553(f) provided that the safety valve could apply to “an offense under” one of the five enumerated statutes listed in that provision. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (2018). The MDLEA was not one of those enumerated statutes. By explicitly listing certain statutes and excluding others, Congress clearly intended for the safety valve provision to apply only to offenses under the specific statutes listed and not to offenses under the MDLEA.
United States v. De La Cruz, No. 18-1710 (1st Cir. May 26, 2021) (internal citations omitted). The Court also reasoned that MDLEA offenses are not “offenses under” 21 U.S.C. § 960—a statute expressly included in the safety valve provision—even though the MDLEA references § 960 for the purpose of sentencing/punishment. Contrary to De La Cruz’s contention, the Court ruled that even though § 70506 incorporates the penalty provision of § 960, it “does not change the fact that those separate statutes each defines and criminalizes different conduct which constitutes the offenses under those two statutes.”
Lastly, the First Circuit reasoned that the history and structure of the MDLEA and safety valve provision supports its decision. Congress did not include the MDLEA among the safety valve’s enumerated offenses despite the safety valve provision being created fourteen (14) years after the enactment of the MDLEA. Additionally, Congress’s amendment in the First Step Act adding the MDLEA to the list of offenses covered under the safety-valve provision evidences that the previous version of the safety-valve provision used at De La Cruz’s sentencing had a narrower scope and did not cover the MDLEA.
As a result of these findings, the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s sentence of the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years’ imprisonment.
The full First Circuit’s decision can be found here.